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It is now generally understood among those acquainted with the process of
recovering1 oil from natural underground reservoirs that the physical efficiency
of the process, as measured by the ratio of oil recovered to oil originally in place,
usually can be increased by artificially assisting or supplementing the natural
expulsive forces. It is also widely appreciated that some of the most productive
techniques of assisted recovery are feasible only if the reservoirs in question are
operated as units. This knowledge, together with the official identification of con-
servation with physical waste prevention, underlies the efforts of the federal
government and the producing states, in their respective jurisdictions, to en-
courage and facilitate the unitization of reservoirs in which there are two or more
lessee-operators or royalty owners for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of
oil recovery.
Statutes and regulations should go beyond mere encouragement and facilita-
tion; they should require unitization of every oil reservoir within a reasonable
time following discovery. Furthermore, unit operation should supplant all present
regulations (e.g., of well spacing and production rates) except those designed to
protect other resources from damage by oil operations. Unit operation, with the
indicated qualification, is a sufficient instrument of conservation. Before proceed-
ing, it is necessary to review some technical facts, indicate the nature of present
regulation, and define conservation in a meaningful way.
II. Pertinent Technical Characteristics of Crude Oil Production
Crude oil in commercial quantities is found where geologic formations of
impermeable material block the vertical and lateral migration of lighter oil
particles in the (salt) water saturating certain tilted strata of porous rock.2 Such
geologic traps form natural reservoirs in which oil particles accumulate on top
of the accompanying water in what oilmen call "pools." Commonly associated
with oil is natural gas, which may accumulate as a "cap" on top of the oil or,
if reservoir pressure is high enough, may be partially or wholly dissolved in the
oil. The fluids in the reservoir are under natural pressure which varies directly
with depth beneath the surface. Wells tapping the reservoir create points of rela-
tively low pressure, so that the fluids tend to flow through the permeable reser-
voir rock into the well bores and to the surface. As fluids are removed from the
* Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin.
1 Recovery is a term of art in the oil industry synonymous with extraction or production.
2 For fuller but not highly technical treatments of the subject see: S. BUCKLEY, Pn-
TROLEUM CONSERVATION (1951); N. CLARK, ELEMENTS OF PETROLEUM RESERVOIRS (1960);
and ENGINEERING COMMITTEE, INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, OIL AND GAS PRO-
DUCTION: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES AND CONSERVATION
METHODS (1951).
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reservoir and not artificially replaced, pressure in the reservoir declines and the
flow of oil to the well bores diminishes accordingly. If oil is extracted slowly
enough, gravity maintains the segregation of associated gas and water, and the
expansion or recharge of these fluids drives the oil to the well bores by a displace-
ment process.' Since reservoirs are usually tilted to some degree, the expansion
of gas or water drives the oil laterally as well as vertically in the reservoir, so that
some wells initially producing oil gradually become gas or water producers as
the gas-oil or water-oil interface passes them. These wells produce during their
commercial life less oil than is originally in place beneath them, while wells lying
in the direction in which oil is driven produce more--sometimes many times
more.
The physical efficiency of the oil recovery process depends in part on some
natural factors over which oil operators have little or no control, such as porosity
and permeability of the reservoir rock, viscosity of the oil, temperature and
pressure in the reservoir, and the alternative natural drives available. In spite of
these factors physical efficiency usually depends significantly on the rate of oil
extraction. If the rate of extraction exceeds some critical level, commonly known
as the maximum efficient rate or MER, gravity can no longer keep gas and
water segregated from oil; these less viscous fluids form channels through the oil
to producing wells, bypassing pockets of oil and, as produced at the wells, de-
pleting reservoir pressure. Once natural pressure is exhausted, it may not be
economically feasible to recover the remaining unproduced oil by secondary
means (e.g., artificial repressuring or water flooding). Physical losses in the form
of unrecovered oil may thus result from an excessive rate of extraction.
As a general rule, once sufficient wells have been drilled in a reservoir to
reveal its areal extent, variations in thickness, potentially recoverable reserves,
alternative natural drives and other operating characteristics-knowledge essen-
tial to establishing relative property rights and determining the maximum rate of
production consistent with no loss of recoverable oil-the physical efficiency of oil
recovery will not be increased by increasing the number of producing wells.
Due to the fluid character of reservoir contents and the pressure-differential
nature of production, the wells essential to information gathering are usually
adequate in number and location to drain a reservoir eventually. Additional
wells are of use only to increase the rate at which oil may be extracted since the
feasible rate of production from a resexvoir, given its degree of depletion, varies
directly with the number of producing wells.
III. Problems and the Regulatory Response
It is readily seen from the above discussion that where there are two or more
lessee-producers operating in a common reservoir, the capacity of oil to flow
freely in the reservoir to points of relatively low pressure creates the possibility of
inducing a flow across property lines. The operator who drills more wells on his
lease or produces at a faster rate than his neighbors can drain oil from their
3 Where gas is dissolved in oil, drive is provided by expansion of the oil as pressure is
released. Once pressure has fallen enough, gas comes out of solution and, if confined to the
reservoir, forms a cap.
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sectors of the reservoir to his. In the absence of agreement among operators or
preventive regulation this possibility, together with the "rule of capture"' theory
as the governing law of property in recovered oil, leads to dense drilling and capac-
ity operation of wells as operators compete for the available oil and gas in a com-
mon reservoir. The results of such competition include unnecessary investment in
wells with correspondingly higher production costs; uncontrolled production of
associated gas, often disposed of by flaring, and rapid depletion of reservoir pres-
sure; progressively increasing production of salt water as it advances across the
reservoir and channels through the sector containing oil with corresponding deple-
tion of reservoir pressure and damage to soil and fresh water from surface disposal
of brine; production of oil in excess of the immediate capacity of transportation
and marketing facilities, necessitating makeshift surface storage (e.g., in open
pits) with loss due to leakage, fire, and evaporation; and loss in the reservoir of oil
otherwise recoverable due to an excessive rate of production. It is clear from this
enumeration that unrestricted competition among operators in a common oil
reservoir, resulting from the independent efforts of each operator to protect or
enhance the value of his property, is wasteful of capital in the development of oil
discoveries (thus discouraging to exploration), is conducive to environmental
damage, and is inconsistent with the efficient recovery of oil.
In general, the producing states and the federal government have reacted
to these problems by seeking to restrain individual operators in their competitive
efforts rather than by removing the motivation to compete for available oil in
a common reservoir. They have enacted statutes' and imposed regulations: to
restrict the density of development wells in each newly discovered reservoir while
requiring the centering of wells on plots of uniform size and shape; to prohibit
or limit the flaring of gas; to require measures in the drilling and plugging of
wells and in the disposal of wastes such as salt water that minimize damage to
fresh water, soil, and other valuable resources; to prevent wasteful surface storage
and the creation of fire hazards; to restrain production of oil in each reservoir
to its maximum efficient rate (MER), or in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
Kansas and New Mexico to the least of its MER, its share of statewide market
demand, or the capacity of transportation and marketing facilities; to allocate
the total allowable monthly production in a reservoir among producers, usually
in proportion to number of wells operated or acreage drained, as a means of
protecting their correlative rights;6 to encourage secondary recovery in old fields
wastefully exploited in an earlier era; and to facilitate the formation of units by
4 Key cases in the development of the rule of capture are: Westmoreland and Cambria
Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724 (1889); Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio
St. 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897); Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 A.
801 (1907).
5 See e.g., Tx. Rev. Civ. STAT. art. 6004-6066d (1962); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
100-6-1 to 22 (1963).
6 The model oil conservation statute prepared by the Interstate Oil Compact Commission
defines "protection of correlative rights" to mean that regulation "should afford a reasonable
opportunity to each Person entitled thereto to recover or receive the Oil and Gas in his tract
or tacts or the equivalent thereof, without being required to drill unnecessary wells or incur
other unnecessary expense. . . 2' INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, A FORM IrOR AN
OIL AND GAS CONSERvATION STATUTE 2 (1959). The capitalized words in the quotation are
terms elsewhere defined in the statute.
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voluntary agreement 7 among competing interests in common reservoirs for the
purpose of secondary recovery, pressure maintenance, or other valid techniques
of increasing the efficiency of oil recovery. The statutes and regulations do not
positively require assisted or secondary recovery, nor do they allow unitization to
substitute for the indicated types of regulation.
There is not space here to make a detailed evaluation of these efforts of the
producing states and the federal government to prevent waste in the search for
and production of oil.' A few brief comments will have to suffice. Granting at
the outset that the indicated regulatory measures as a whole have been helpful,
benefiting both the industry and the general public, they are defective in two
important ways. First, they do not adequately protect correlative rights, where
such rights are defined properly. In the ordinary situation where some wells in a
reservoir have structural advantage or disadvantage depending on whether oil
is driven toward or away from them by expanding gas or water, producers' rights
to the oil originally in place beneath their surface leases are not protected by
allowing each well draining a tract of given size to produce at the same rate as
every other in the reservoir as long as it can. Wells having structural advantage
continue to produce long after they have extracted all the oil originally in place
beneath them-their owners thus gaining valuable property at the expense of
those whose wells suffer from structural disadvantage. Second, by aiming at phys-
ical efficiency-or the prevention of physical waste in the language of the typical
conservation statute--existing regulatory measures do not necessarily benefit the
industry or society in every instance and certainly do not maximize the benefit
we derive from our oil resources over an extended period of time. For example,
the limitation of production in a reservoir to the maximum efficient rate, where
efficiency is conceived in physical terms, ignores the possibility that the increased
recovery of oil at some future date may not be worth, to producers or to society,
the required sacrifice of current consumption. Similarly, the gas saved by flatly
prohibiting flaring may not be worth the cost of some other disposition, such as
returning it to the reservoir to help maintain pressure. In short, if benefit is the
aim of conservation, the mere prevention of physical waste is not a satisfactory
approach to it. We need a more meaningful definition of oil conservation than
the promotion of physical efficiency in its recovery and use.
IV. A Meaningful Definition of Conservation
The proper aim of conservation is to benefit society. If this is accepted, we
can then tentatively, and in very general terms, define conservation of oil (or
of any other resource) as that manner of recovery and distribution of use over
7 Twenty-one producing states have statutes under which the state conservation commis-
sion may order a reservoir unitized if a large majority (60 to 80 percent) of both operating
and royalty interests have voluntarily agreed on a unitization plan. See, e.g., ARY. STAT. ANN.§§ 53-115 '(Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1301 to 1315 (Su'. 1969). For a complete
list of the states and some qualifying comments, see S. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS 217-25 (1971).
8 For a detailed evalution, see S. McDonald, supra note 7, at 113-226.
9 Most statutes follow the language of the model statute published by the Interstate Oil
Compact Commission. For that language, see LEGAL COMMITTEE, INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT
COMMISSION, A FORM FOR AN OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION STATUTE § 1 (1959).
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time which maximizes benefit to society. To make this definition more precise
and concrete we must show how to measure benefit and, since time is involved,
how to weigh future benefit against present benefit.
Conceptually the benefit derived from the acquisition and use of a good is
the net gain in satisfactions by members of society. Acquisiton involves sacrifice
of satisfactions (e.g., of leisure or command over other goods) and use yields
positive satisfactions. If the required sacrifice is less than the resulting gain of
satisfactions, then acquisition and use of the good are beneficial. Satisfactions given
up or gained are, of course, subjective and not directly measurable; but they are
indirectly indicated by the prices we must pay to get people to accept sacrifice
and by the prices people are willing to pay to get satisfactions. In well-function-
ing competitive markets the prices of productive inputs (e.g., wages) tend to
measure incremental sacrifice by their owners, and the prices of finished output
tend to measure incremental gain of satisfactions by their consumers. Thus, if
the cost of an incremental product is less than its price, society benefits from its
production. Benefit to society is maximized when for every product incremental
cost equals price.
Where time is involved in a production or consumption decision, a special
kind of cost is relevant. This is the sacrifice of satisfactions resulting from the
postponement of consumption. In competitive capital markets the rate of interest
tends to equal the incremental sacrifice of this sort. The gain from postponement
of consumption is the rate of return on incremental investment. Society benefits
from an incremental postponement of consumption when the rate of return
exceeds the rate of interest or, equivalently, when future consumption discounted
at the rate of interest has a greater value than the consumption presently sac-
rificed. Social benefits are maximized when postponement of consumption is
pushed to the point where on the last increment the discounted value of future
consumption just equals the value of the necessary sacrifice of current consump-
tion.
The conservation of a depletable resource such as oil always involves some
degree of postponement of consumption or use. Of course, transferring use from
present to future allows the saving of some present production costs and requires
the incurring of some future production costs. Thus maximizing benefit to society
requires pushing postponement to the point where on the last increment the dis-
counted value of net proceeds (value to consumers less production costs) just
equals the value of net proceeds currently sacrificed.
These considerations lead to the following precise and concrete definition of
oil conservation: it is that manner of recovery and distribution of use over time
which maximizes the present value of oil resources to society, expected future net
proceeds from them being discounted at the prevailing rate of interest. Implied
in this definition are at least three propositions: (1) oil and gas physically re-
coverable will be recovered for current or future use when the discounted value
of them exceeds the cost of their recovery; (2) in discovered and developed
reservoirs production will be postponed when the discounted value of future net
proceeds thereby made possible exceeds the value of current net proceeds sac-
rificed; (3) exploration for new reserves will be expanded when the discounted
[VoL 49:305]
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value of expected discoveries, these to be operated in accordance with proposi-
tions (1) and (2), exceeds the necessary investment outlays. All of these prop-
ositions imply continuous cost-benefit comparisons and action to maximize net
benefit to society.
It should be emphasized that the above definition of oil conservation implies
current responsiveness to expected future demands for oil. The net proceeds
from an increment to current production are weighed against those of an alter-
native increment to future production, allowing for the postponement cost re-
flected in the rate of interest. If, given initially a benefit-maximizing distribution
of production over time, expected future demand should rise relative to current
demand, the corresponding rise in expected future net proceeds would lead to an
incremental shift from current to future production. Similarly, a fall in expected
future demand would lead to an incremental shift from future to current produc-
tion. In short, the definition implies that production will always shift incremen-
tally from periods when oil is less valuable to periods when it is more valuable,
so that the benefit-maximizing distribution of production over time is continu-
ously sought under changing conditions.
V. Why Unregulated Oil Producers Will Not Adequately Conserve Oil
No doubt it will have occurred to the reader that businessmen in trying to
maximize their profits make the same kinds of cost-benefit comparison as those
described above. They maximize their profits by pushing production to the
point where incremental cost equals price. Where time is involved, as in oil
recovery, they push postponement of production to the point where the incre-
mental sacrifice of current net proceeds equals the incremental discounted value
of expected future net proceeds. They push exploration and other forms of in-
vestment to the point where the incremental outlay equals the increment to the
value of new assets acquired. Why, then, if oilmen are businessmen, does their
free behavior not result in conservation of oil?
The answer is that in one key respect, where there are two or more oil
producers in a common reservoir, oilmen's costs differ from those of society.
Specifically, for one among many oilmen operating in a common reservoir, the
cost of accelerating current production contains a mitigating element, the gain
of oil from beneath neighbors' leases, which is not present in the cost to society. 0
Thus, one man's gain is another's loss. Put another way, for the individual
operator the sacrifice of future net proceeds from the lease due to the loss of
otherwise recoverable oil in the reservoir as a whole is offset in some degree by
the gain of current net proceeds from the lease that stems from currently produc-
ing oil at the expense of neighbors. Since their costs of accelerating current
production are always less than those of society, individual operators acting
independently will always produce in the present too rapidly to maximize bene-
fit to society and, to make such a rate of production possible, will drill too many
wells. Moreover, because explorers come to expect dense drilling in new dis-
10. Private costs may differ from social costs also when private action leads to environ-
mental damage. Hence current regulation should be revised to prevent or limit such damage.
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coveries, the prospective net value to them of new discoveries is dimin-
ished, and the margin of profitable exploration is contracted relative to what
it would have been with a more rational density of drilling. Thus, on two counts
too little oil is made available to future consumers.
VI. The Solution: Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs
By now it should be evident that the conservation problem in oil results
from the combination of the fluid nature of reservoir contents and the multi-
plicity of property interests in the typical reservoir. It would seem to follow
that a solution to the problem is to eliminate one of these circumstances, and
since the latter is the only one amenable to change, there is no choice to make.
There is available a well-known, widely used device of eliminating the multi-
plicity of property interests in common oil reservoirs: unitization and unit opera-
tion of such reservoirs.
Unitization consists of pooling, by means of agreement or valid order of a
conservation commission, the separate property interests in oil and gas to be pro-
duced from the affected reservoir; providing for the relative shares of owners in
proceeds from production and in costs of development and production; adopting
a plan for the development and operation of the reservoir as a unit; and des-
ignating one or more operators as manager(s) of the reservoir on behalf of the
owners as a whole. Unit operation consists of developing the reservoir and re-
covering oil and gas from it without regard to property lines, but with a view
to benefiting the owners as a whole. As a group enterprise, a reservoir unit is
similar in spirit, function, and consequence to a business corporation, although
there is no chartering by the state and no taxation of unit profits except as in-
come of the separate owners. An owner of an interest in a unit may sell or
bequeath his interest or pledge it as collateral for a loan. The property rights of
an owner are modified only with respect to the separate development and opera-
tion of his lease.'1
It is obvious that once properties in oil and gas output are pooled and
shares in costs and revenues fixed, it is no longer possible for an individual
operator to gain income by producing faster than his neighbors in a common
reservior. The pertinent costs to the individual operator, his fixed share of the
costs of the reservoir as a whole, no longer deviate from those of society; so the
aim of maximizing private profit now becomes consistent with maximizing bene-
fit to society. Through their unit manager the operators are induced by profit
considerations to speed up current production only when the gain in present net
proceeds exceeds the discounted sacrifice of future net proceeds, including in the
latter the value of unrecovered oil. They are induced to drill wells in addition
to those required for discovery and reservoir information only when the addi-
tional investment is less than the gain in discounted net proceeds from the
acceleration of recovery made possible. They are induced to adopt techniques
11 For a discussion of the legal aspects of forming a unit see Williams, The Negotiation




of assisted recovery, such as reinjection of produced gas or salt water' 2 to main-
tain pressure, or of secondary recovery when the cost is less than the gain of dis-
counted net proceeds. If unitization of newly discovered reservoirs is routine,
explorers come to expect the most socially beneficial development and operation
of them, so that they are induced by the comparison of investment outlay with
value acquired to expand the margin of exploration to the most socially bene-
ficial point. In short, oil operators are led to take whatever action enhances the
value of oil resources to them; their costs and revenues in turn more accurately
reflect the sacrifices and satisfactions of society; and their decisions tend to maxi-
mize the value of oil resources to society. Such action is what is properly meant
by conservation.
It is perhaps incidental, but nonetheless important, that unitization of oil
reservoirs is a direct and effective way of protecting correlative rights. Once
relative shares in costs and revenues are fixed, it is no longer significant that
some wells or leases have structural advantage, for it no longer matters through
what wells the oil in the reservoir is recovered. Indeed, the unit manager might
drill wells chiefly in the end of the reservoir toward which oil tends to be driven,
thus saving the cost of wells that would become water producers at an early date
and that would not be useful as water injection wells. It could be provided by
statute and regulation that valid unitization agreements must specify relative
shares in costs and revenues corresponding to relative shares in oil and gas orig-
inally in place, as best that can be determined, so that correlative rights can
truly be protected.
Mandatory unitization of all oil reservoirs would have a number of im-
portant advantages over the present state and federal systems of conservation
regulation. First, and most importantly, it would result in conservation in a
meaningful sense. It would harness the ingenuity, enterprise, and energy of pro-
fit-motivated businessmen in the interest of society as a whole, and would permit
the flexible adjustment of current vs. future recovery under changing circum-
stances. Second, by holding out to explorers the prospect of being able to de-
velop and produce new discoveries on the most economical terms, it would en-
courage exploration and contribute to solving the problem, now referred to as
the "energy crisis," of equating supplies of oil and gas with growing demand in
the years ahead. Third, it would result in true protection of correlative rights.
And fourth, it would allow us to dispense with all of the elaborate and expensive
machinery of present detailed regulation except that necessary to restrain drilling
and production in the preunitization period of information-gathering and to
protect the environment from damages from drilling and production activities.
I believe these advantages far outweigh the disadvantages; some of the more
significant of which shall now be considered.
12 Note that the reinjection of produced salt water combines pressure maintenance with
environmentally safe waste disposal. The competitive operator in an ununitized reservoir would
ordinarily find independent salt water reinjection unprofitable, since he would bear all the
costs and get only a part of the benefit. Under unitization, he would bear his share of the
costs and get his share of the benefit.
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VII. Some Disadvantages or Problems
Numerous discussions of these ideas with oilmen and regulators indicate
that they would prefer to continue the present system with which they are famil-
iar. This is particularly true of small, independent oilmen. They object to the
idea of unitization being compulsory as if the requirements of present regulation
were not. Often these individuals do not appreciate the distinction between
physical waste prevention and the maximization of benefit from oil resources.
Their usual feelings are that they benefit economically from the present system-
particularly the limitation of production to market demand and the allocation
of total allowable production among all producers. These limitations tend to
support prices and to protect independent producers from discrimination in pur-
chases by major integrated firms. Many, especially small independents, feel that
the typical unit manager would be a representative of a major oil company who
would not adequately consider their interests. The question of prosecution under
antitrust laws is often raised since the members of a unit, representing several
otherwise competing firms, in effect combine through their manager to restrain
current production for whatever reason. These reactions deserve attention:
particularly, three criticisms which seem to have special merit.
A. Price Stability
Before conservation regulation in the present pattern was instituted in most
major producing states around the 1929-1933 period, each large new discovery
of oil was followed by rapid development, uncontrolled production, and sharp
reduction in prices at a local level until the depletion of reservoir pressure and
consequent decline in output permitted a resurgence of prices after a year or
two. Older oilmen have never forgotten this instability, and they value highly
the system that restrains production to market demand (implicitly at the
going price) and thus supports the going price. Would they have to give up
price stability under a regime of universal unitization and unregulated produc-
tion? The answer is, yes, to some degree but not completely. In the "bad old
days" of freedom from any sort of regulation, prices were so unstable because
supply was so unresponsive to price: any producer who attempted to reduce
output would simply lose oil to his neighbors. But under unitization, supply
would be quite responsive to price. A modest decline in current price relative
to expected future prices would lead a unit manager to reduce current output
in order to take advantage of relatively higher net proceeds to be had in future
years. This action would of course tend to limit the decline in current price.
So prices would be considerably more stable under the present proposal than in
the days before regulation. I doubt, however, that they would be as stable as
they are under limitation of output to market demand.
B. Discrimination Against Small Independent Operators
Before the institution of the present system of regulation, temporary excess
supply not only depressed prices but often left independent producers without
[Vol. 49:305]
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buyers as the major integrated firms gave preference to the product of their own
wells. The independents had to produce for makeshift surface storage, with
attendant losses from leakage, evaporation and fire, or have oil drained from
their leases by integrated neighbors. The limitation of total output to market
demand and the allocation of the total among all producers in the affected area
effectively eliminate the possibility of purchaser discrimination. Would indepen-
dents have to give up this protection under my proposal? I think not. As for
discrimination within a reservoir, unitization prevents it absolutely since each
producer gets his fixed share of reservoir output regardless of the wells through
which it comes. As for discrimination among reservoirs, price competition would
make it unprofitable. If there were a temporary excess supply and an integrated
firm reduced its purchases from a reservoir owned by independents, a small
reduction in price at this reservoir would make purchases there more profitable
for the integrated firm than sacrificing future net proceeds from its own; for if
the integrated firm were maximizing the value of its reservoirs before the fall in
price, incremental current net proceeds were exactly equal to the discounted
value of incremental expected future net proceeds.
Suppose an integrated firm were unit manager in two reservoirs, owning an
eighty percent interest in one and a forty percent interest in the other; and sup-
pose there were a general reduction in demand for oil so that the two reservoirs
could not both sell all of their output at the previous most profitable rate of
production. Would not the integrated firm discriminate in favor of the reser-
voir in which it had the larger interest? No. With its shares in each reservoir
fixed, the firm would maximize its profits by operating each reservoir at its most
profitable rate."3 In the face of a decrease in demand its efforts to maintain the
initial rates would cause a decline in current price. It would then be profitable
to reduce current output in each so as to shift some recovery from present to
future. There would then be a new, lower optimum profit rate for each, and
it would be in the integrated firm's interest to operate each at that rate. The
two reservoirs would share proportionately in the lower demand regardless of
the different degrees of ownership by their common manager. These comments
depend on the assumption that oilmen seek to maximize their profits in the
sense of maximizing the value of expected net proceeds. This is a reasonable
assumption although there may occasionally be an operator so bent on injuring
a rival that he is willing to aocept injury to himself. Perhaps the occasional
case would warrant supervision of unit managers by conservation commissions
to prevent such clear cases of discrimination as that hypothesized in the example
just discussed.
C. Antitrust Prosecution
Fear of antitrust prosecution was one of the earliest reactions to efforts to
unitize oil reservoirs. To eliminate such fears nearly all of the producing states
have enacted statutes& ' specifically exempting unit operations approved by con-
13 It is easy to see that taking production from one reservoir to add to the production of
the other would cause both reservoirs to be less profitable; so the firm with a fixed share in
each must itself suffer a loss of profits.
14 E.g., Wyo. STAT. Amr. § 30-222 '(1967); Txx. Rlv. Crv. STAT. art. 6008b, § 5 (1962).
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servation commissions from state antitrust laws. Even in states without such
statutes, no unit has ever been prosecuted on antitrust grounds. While there is
no comparable federal statute, official policy on federally owned lands is to en-
courage unitization of oil reservoirs, and the one federal antitrust suit brought
against a unit, 5 dismissed before trial, did not challenge unit operation as such
but alleged discriminatory marketing practices. In his thorough study of the
history of unitization in relation to the antitrust problem, Hardwickee firmly
laid to rest the notion that unitization for conservation purposes, as conceived
by existing laws, may be in violation of state or federal antitrust laws.
But existing law conceives of conservation as preventing physical waste and
does not exempt units from specific regulation for that purpose. So there re-
mains the possibility that an attorney general or a court might view the unregu-
lated actions of a unit for the purpose of conservation as I have defined it (e.g.,
restraint of current production to get the benefit of expected higher prices in
future) as a violation of state or federal antitrust laws. On purely economic
grounds there would be no justification for such a view, unless there were collu-
sion among a number of units; for there are thousands of separate reservoirs in
this country, each of which if unitized would be comparable to a firm in another
industry, and the actions of the operators of no one of these reservoirs could
significantly affect the total supply and price of oil. Since the mix of operating
firms would vary among reservoirs, as would the firm identities of the unit man-
agers, it probably would be no less difficult for units to collude than firms in
another industry of comparable structure. Nor would universal unitization lead
to greater concentration of control of oil production. Given the thousands of
individual reservoirs that would be unitized, the law of large numbers would result
in a firm that presently owns X percent of oil capacity in the country being the
principal owner in X percent of reservoirs and likely being appointed unit man-
ager of such proportion of reservoirs. There is no reason why the large com-
panies should be more able to wrest control from independent producers.
If there would be thousands of separate units, no one of which could signi-
ficantly affect supply and price; if collusion would be unfeasible, due to great
numbers geographically dispersed and various combinations of owners in differ-
ent units; if concentration of control would not be increased; then, there is no
reason on economic grounds for the oil-producing industry to behave as other
than a highly competitive industry under a regime of universal unitization of oil
reservoirs. Thus, there would be no economic basis on which to challenge uni-
versal unitization under state or federal antitrust laws. For an individual unit
to restrict current production in the hope of getting a higher price in the future
would be no more in restraint of trade than for an individual farmer to withhold
beef or wheat from the current market in the same hope.
15 United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 77 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. La.),
af'd per curiam, 339 U.S. 940 '(1948).





The concept of unitization of oil reservoirs for efficient recovery of oil is
not new. There are hundreds of successful unit operations in the United States
today," initiated by voluntary agreement of all or a large majority of the owner-
ship interests in the affected reservoirs, usually for the purpose of secondary
recovery in old fields. What this article proposes is new: The mandatory unit-
ization of all reservoirs soon after discovery, this form of regulation substituting
for all existing regulation (e.g., of well spacing and production rates) save that
designed to protect the environment.
This proposal would require legislation both to mandate unitization and
to exempt unit operations from state and federal antitrust laws. To date, the
several states have assumed jurisdiction over petroleum conservation regulation
in areas other than upon federally owned lands. If this division of jurisdiction
is soundly based in constitutional law, the burden of legislation must fall largely
on the states although the federal government can exercise demonstrative leader-
ship by acting with respect to the federal lands, particularly the outer con-
tinental shelf, which is believed to be rich in undiscovered oil and gas deposits.
At the very least, the federal government can facilitate appropriate action at the
state level by specifically exempting noncollusive unit operations from federal
antitrust laws. It is the author's hope that the above discussion of the economics
of the matter will serve as an invitation to members of the legal profession to
address themselves to the related problems of law in achieving the goal of unit-
ization.
17 According to the only published survey available, the number of units increased from
130 in 1948 to 1,550 in 1962. INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, A STUDY OF CON-
SERVATION OF OIL AND GAS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1964, at 62 (1965). I estimate that the
number has at least doubled since 1962.
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